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A New Nomos Offshore and Bodies as their
Own Signs
Stephanie Jones and Stewart Motha
Abstract, This paper begins with the paradoxes that accrue around the
appearance of Robinson Crusoe and his “Man Friday” within recent judg-
ments relating to the Chagos Archipelago. These references are understood
as revealing the complex of anxieties and limits that are the ﬁnal legacy of
these rulings. In particular, we trace the ways in which  through Daniel
Defoe’s iconic characters  these judgments enact a troubling retreat from
review of executive action, and a fuller withdrawal of sensibility from situa-
tions of “otherness” that both bear and cannot bear analogy to that of Friday.
The paper then more brieﬂy considers a similar complex of anxieties and lim-
its, retreats and withdrawals enacted by recent judgments relating to Austra-
lian territory in the Indian Ocean. This allows us to suggest that between
these two series of highest court rulings, the Anglophone common law is cur-
rently constructing the Indian Ocean as an offshore: a site excised from judi-
cial review, and a site in which certain ﬁgures  peoples, individuals  are
not considerable in both senses of the word. But in fathoming this, we turn to
Derrida’s insights on sovereignty to argue that, far from being new, this con-
struction of a common law of the Indian Ocean tells us about the affront of
an archaic sovereignty that always already determines and is determined by
law. Across the arguments of this paper, these perceptions of judgment,
geography and sovereignty are enabled by literature, and speciﬁcally by read-
ing the return of Crusoe and Friday in a recent novel form (by J. M. Coetzee)
that also broaches the limits of judgment and recognition, but through a kind
of vigilant silence  an abstinence  that craves an alternative commonality:
and in this very longing, resists the silencing complicities of the UK and Aus-
tralian judgments with the disembodiment of a littoral nomos, offshore.
Keywords, Chagos Archipelago,
J. M. Coetzee, Indian Ocean, judi-
cial review, nomos, offshore, Rob-
inson Crusoe, sovereignty
INTRODUCTION
In a world of chance, is there a better or a worse? We yield to a
stranger’s embrace or give ourselves to the waves; for the blink of
an eyelid our vigilance relaxes; we are asleep; and when we awake,
we have lost the direction of our lives. What are these blinks of an
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eyelid, against which the only defence is an eternal and inhuman
wakefulness? Might they not be the cracks and chinks through
which another voice, other voices, speak in our lives? By what right
do we close our ears to them?1
In The Nomos of the Earth Carl Schmitt characterizes nomos as the “first mea-
sure of all subsequent measures.”2 Nomos is linked to the first land appropriations,
the partition and classification of space, and to primeval divisions and distribu-
tions.3 For Schmitt nomos is what gives a spatially concrete unity by which a people
or tribe becomes settled or historically situated; becomes visible in the appropria-
tion of land during the founding of a city or colony.4 Schmitt compares nomos to the
English term “radical title” (to be treated as original spatial ordering).5 Nomos also
has a future. There will be perpetually new manifestations of nomos when space is
apportioned in every historical epoch.6 This is not to say that Schmitt offers an
account of nomos adequate for all time.
Schmitt has become a handy source of blinding paradigms and binary opposi-
tions. Norm and exception, friend and foe, land and sea have all come to mark con-
temporary legal and political analyses with a seemingly timeless logic. These
frameworks have become a feature of engagements with neo-imperialism, the “new
world order,” “post 9/11,” and the “war on terror.” Taking turns at rounding a corner
of history and marking it as a paradigm shift seems to be what is at stake in deploy-
ing concepts that formulaically stand in for saying that “everything is different
now.” We are regularly told that we live in a “state of exception,” or, as Giorgio
Agamben has put it:
the state of exception is therefore the principle of every juridical
localization, since only the state of exception opens the space in
which the determination of a certain juridical order and a particular
territory first becomes possible. As such, the state of exception itself
is thus essentially unlocalizable (even if definite spatiotemporal lim-
its can be assigned to it from time to time).7
Agamben goes on to argue that the concentration camp is the “space that corre-
sponds to the originary structure of the nomos.”8 This nomos, unlike Schmitt’s
Nomos, is an “unlocalizable zone of indistinction,” and is evidence of Agamben’s cen-
tral thesis that the state of exception has become the rule.9 While paying attention
to transformations in the nature of sovereign power is important, we want to probe
how bodies feature in juridical encounters with persons who have seemingly been
rendered outside law in constituting and sustaining the juridical order. Such per-
sons are often cast as indistinguishable abject bodies  as wholly other, bare life, or
beyond the mediation of legal systems. Occasionally, judges deploy tropes, meta-
phors  or as in the cases we examine here  characters in novels to mark the
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encounter with a body that must be placed in an imperial historical continuum, but
without conceding any substance or quiddity to that person.
Our paradoxical aim, then, in suggesting the emergence of a new nomos
“offshore” is precisely to counter the assertion that the exigencies of exceptional sov-
ereign power can account for the placement of bodies inside or outside a territorially
determined juridical order.10 Far from being “unlocalizable,” sovereign power oper-
ates by attributing signs to bodies whose localization offshore is central to the produc-
tion of their juridical status and that of the sovereign authority they come in contact
with. We seek to displace the sense that land, sea, island  on- and offshore  are
matters of fact. By focusing on bodies and their signification through the geographi-
cal and juridical formation of islands in the Indian Ocean  in the Chagos Archipel-
ago and on Australia’s Christmas Island (Figure 1)  we stress that a littoral
jurisprudence must pay attention to the terms in which bodies are encountered.
There can be no nomos without the signs that mark bodies. Our intention is to open
a discussion of the ethics and politics of “bodies as their own signs.”
Nomos is the juridicalized combination of animal and human bodies marked in
space. As Cornelia Vismann has argued, this is the “primordial scene of the nomos”
which “opens with a drawing of a line in the soil.”11 It is the opening scene of law 
initiating a concept of law tied to agriculture, the tilling of soil, a sign of owner-
ship.12 This economy of cultivating is also “writing by an ox.”13 This is
“boustrophedon [ox turning] writing”  a writing that moves like an ox pulling a
plough, back and forth, changing direction, mirroring the previous line.14 Schmitt’s
Figure 1. The Indian Ocean
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opposition between nomos as the concrete order of space and nomos as abstract nor-
mativism (Kelsen) is characterized by Vismann as a battleground between jus ter-
rendi and jus scriptum. Our analysis draws particular attention to the jus
scriptum. Nomos manifests orders of territorial space and writing. This reflects a
tension between land/economy and the writing of figures into and out of a juridical
order. But it is also the (animal) “body that marks the soil” and “attests to the
human power executed in the land.”15 We want to stay with the ox, the many beasts
such as the beast of burden pulling the plough. And it is that relation between the
beast and man, beast and sovereign, that we develop below.
The “offshore” is a spatial ordering that carries the primordial scene of nomos into
the present. If nomos gives form to the spatial visibility of the social and political order
of a people, it is doubtful whether it can be immediate in the sense of not being medi-
ated. Mediation  and for our purposes, legal mediation and signification  may in
fact be the key to a nomos, so that to divide and to pasture would not bematerial acts
alone, but ones that inaugurate a nomos precisely because they are the site of signifi-
cation. This signification would mark the putting in to relation of beings (human and
animal) and the putting into relation of beings in space (as land, ocean, territory).
Through the examination of a series of court rulings, this paper argues that the
Anglophone common law is constituting the Indian Ocean as an archive of sovereign
violence. Sovereign violence is taken offshore, and thus more readily removed from
the reach of judicial review. These offshore sites of sovereign violence become places
where certain figures  peoples, individuals  are beneath consideration. That is,
they become a space in which individuals or peoples cannot be seen, heard, felt: and
in which their insubstantiality comes to define the Indian Ocean and its islands as
ghostly, haunted, unfathomable. In fathoming this, we finally argue that, far from
being new, this construction of a common law of the Indian Ocean tells us about the
affront of an archaic sovereignty that always already determines and is determined
by law.
PART I: THE OTHER BODY
In April 2013, the UK High Court ruled American Embassy “cables” obtained and
published by WikiLeaks inadmissible as evidence (WikiLeaks).16 The document at
issue purportedly summarizes a May 2009 meeting between UK and US govern-
ment officials. The subject of the meeting was the Chagos Archipelago, or rather the
area of islands and sea controversially constituted as “British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory” (BIOT) (see Figure 1). The discussion focused on a Foreign and Common-
wealth Office plan to declare BIOT a Marine Protected Area (MPA), and involved
reassurance that this would “not impact the [US military] base on Diego Garcia
[the largest of the Chagos islands constituting BIOT] in any way.”17 As recognized
by the court, the case was a “further chapter in the history of litigation arising out
of the removal and subsequent exclusion of the local population from the Chagos
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Archipelago” by the UK government in the late 1960s and early 1970s.18 The cable
was central to the applicants’ allegation that the creation of the MPA was driven by
an “improper motive, namely an intention to create an effective long-term way to
prevent Chagossians and their descendants from resettling in BIOT.”19 A key para-
graph involves a description of Colin Roberts, then Commissioner of BIOT, guaran-
teeing that “there would be ‘no human footprints’ or ‘Man Fridays’ on the BIOT’s
uninhabited islands.” The cable continues that “He asserted that establishing a
marine park would, in effect, put paid to resettlement claims of the archipelago’s
former residents.”20
In his judgment for the court, Richards LJ does not permit the Foreign Office to
rely on Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) policy to prevent the use of the cable as
evidence. He worries that this could “in principle […] conceal an improper and
unlawful motive for an executive act which is claimed to have had an adverse
impact upon the rights of a significant number of individuals of Chagossian origin
or descent.”21 He further determines that the Official Secrets Act 1989 does not
“prevent its use in proceedings,” mostly for the practical reason that the information
is already in the public domain.22 But he does conclude that the 1961 Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations, brought into force by the Diplomatic Privileges
Act 1964, demands the exclusion of “illicitly obtained diplomatic documents and cor-
respondence” as evidence.23 Through this reasoning, Richards LJ allows the court
to avoid making a finding on the authenticity of the cable,24 but provides some room
for a questioning of Roberts and others on its veracity. The judgment includes a
detailed summary of Roberts’s response to cross-examination:
[Roberts] accepted that it was government policy that there should
be no human footprint in the Chagos Archipelago other than on
Diego Garcia and it is likely he would have said words to that effect.
He adamantly denied making any reference to “Man Fridays,” for
reasons which he explained: it was a quote from a colonial official
from the 1960s and was considered in the FCO [Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office] to be highly regrettable in every sense and offen-
sive to the Chagossians. He accepted that he recognised that the
declaration of an MPA, if “entrenched” (i.e. in a law which would be
impossible or difficult to repeal) would create a serious obstacle to
resettlement.25
This summary is not necessary to Richards LJ’s legal reasoning. As such, it has a
curious rhetorical value within the judgment. There is a sense that the court must
consider the invocation of “Man Fridays” and consolidate Roberts’s denial in order
to produce a narrative that is affectively and manifestly just.26 This sensibility is
continuous with earlier judicial approaches to that infamous FCO memo.27
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In his 2000 judgment that the expulsion of the Chagossians from the archipelago
was unlawful, Laws LJ spends not insignificant time on FCO correspondence in
order to “lay bare the concerns and attitudes of British officials and ministers at the
material time” (Bancoult 1).28 He draws out:
A note dated 24 August 1966 quotes a minute from the Permanent Under-Secre-
tary (I assume at the Colonial Office). The Permanent Under-Secretary unbur-
dened himself thus:
“We must surely be very tough about this. The object of the exercise
was to get some rocks which will remain ours; there will be no indig-
enous population except seagulls who have not yet got a Committee
(the Status of Women Committee does not cover the rights of
Birds).”
This attracted a comment from another official, a Mr Greenhill, who spoke the
same language:
“Unfortunately along with the Birds go some few Tarzans or Men
Fridays whose origins are obscure, and who are being hopefully
wished on to Mauritius etc. When that has been done I agree we
must be very tough and a submission is being done accordingly.”29
As in Richards LJ’s judgment, it is not necessary to Laws LJ’s reasoning to engage
with the characterization of the Chagossians as “Men Fridays.” He moves onto lon-
ger statements by figures more significant and powerful than Greenhill, that more
directly evidence intent to disenfranchise the islanders. The judge rather seems
compelled to address the invocation of Friday because it is somehow emphatic of a
certain kind of “language,” and because the act of rejecting that language produces
an affect of justice.30 But why is the characterization of the Chagossians as “Men
Fridays” or “Man Fridays” so intuitively offensive? Why are Richards and Laws LJs
anxious to distance and deplore the invocation of this figure? What judgments are
carried out by these rhetorical moves, and what forms of judgment are circum-
scribed? Asking these questions reveals more than one irony, and joins the appear-
ance of Friday in these legal stories to the long tradition of reading Defoe’s novel
paradoxically.
“Few writers enjoyed paradox as much as [Daniel] Defoe.”31 So it is easy to imag-
ine him relishing a long tradition of finding paradox within and via his most famous
work, The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719). For
Karl Marx, the paradox is Crusoe, famously obsessed with exchange, a cipher for
capitalism in the intellectual history of political economy, “a true-born Briton”: and
yet staunchly on his Caribbean island, “appreciating all the essential determinants
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of value,” radically un-alienated from the products of his labor.32 For Ian Watt, Rob-
inson Crusoe is the first novel in revealing  but paradoxically not answering  a
readership yearning for consolation, sociality and romance; a yearning that later
novels, fully formed, rose to fulfill.33 And for Edward Said, Robinson Crusoe is a first
novel in constituting England offshore, but paradoxically through the representa-
tion of imperial space and the native Friday as subject and other.34 In Virginia
Woolf’s reading, Crusoe’s narrative gives us “no sunsets and no sunrise; there is no
solitude and no soul,” but Defoe’s novel, “by reiterating that nothing but a plain
earthenware pot stands in the foreground, persuades us to see […] the solitudes of
the human soul.”35 And in similar vein, for Jacques Derrida, Crusoe on his island is
paradigmatic of the indivisibility of the sovereign. Yet in epitomizing aloneness, he
paradoxically becomes akin to an-other of the sovereign, the beast.36 The FCO and
judicial references to Friday are not exactly intertextual gestures. That is, they are
not quoting the original Friday of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Nor are they quoting
any one of the many and diverse re-castings of Friday within the long and continu-
ing tradition of re-writing Defoe’s novel.37 They are drawing on a distilled but vague
idea of Friday that circulates in the global imagination with a strangely perfervid
insistence. This Friday is a historically and geographically de-contextualized
“native”: an abstraction, under imperialist rubrics of savagery, amenable to slavery.
In this sense, the judgments work with a crude idea of an aboriginal Friday. Most
immediately, this is put before the judges by the court proceedings. The claimant’s
barrister continually positions the cable reference to “Man Fridays” as a litmus test
of Roberts and his colleague’s memory of the general tone of the meeting. So their
exchanges focus “Man Fridays” as a “totemic phrase […] a phrase that offends,” and
prompt more ponderous discussion of the extent to which the reference to Friday in
the 1966 memo was in the public domain, such that it might have been falsely
attributed to the commissioner by the American author of the cable.38 It is ironic,
then, that the original Friday is not so simply “totemic,” but queries what it means
to be indigenous. And this sense of irony is further heightened if we recognize that
in Defoe’s novel, Friday’s position on his island is analogous to the historical situa-
tion of the Chagossians in ways that might increase, not deplete, a felt understand-
ing of the particularity of their situation.
Like Friday, the island at the centre of Defoe’s novel has become disembodied
from the text, if not so fully from textuality itself. Although unlike Friday, this
island circulates in the global imagination more variously, not necessarily contra-
dictorily as a signifier of empty/replete/open/enclosed/imperial/colonial/existential/
providential space.39 Returning to Defoe’s narrative with less expansive and more
material intent, we find the island is positioned by a curious mix of vague and spe-
cific coordinates. It is somewhere off the Atlantic, within the Caribbean. It is one of
a number of islands taking character from their relative position to a mainland
coastline that is defined by mention of the mouth of the Orinoco, and the effect of
that sweep of water in isolating and connecting shores.40 It is, in other words, a site
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that comes to be defined by its place within a region. Notably, this regional sensibil-
ity is given to Crusoe (and thence to the reader) by Friday. But this moment comes
long after the fuller articulation of the island in other terms.
Shipwrecked on the island, Crusoe quickly determines it is uninhabited in being
unpeopled.41 He conceives himself as a first inhabitant of a terra nullius in ways
that are, apparently inevitably, productive of masculine resourcefulness and
English law: he builds, he clears, he plants, he crops, he makes and reinvents, even
if he does not invent.42 The narrative famously moves  as much as it does move
over those first 24 years of puritan isolation  between Crusoe’s expressions of des-
perate loneliness, and of triumphant sovereignty as he settles the island. But a
major shift in plot and tone occurs when he discovers that the island is not unpeo-
pled in the sense that it is not unused or unvisited by “others.” His discovery that
groups of local people come to the other side of the island to fight, kill, cook and eat
each other leads to the further consolidation of his sovereignty through the building
of fortifications. But of course this twist in the register of his anxiety  from anxiety
about being alone to anxiety about not being alone  takes a further turn when he
rescues a native from a cannibal skirmish, names him Friday, and takes on the
white man’s burden of teaching him to speak English, to know a Christian God, and
to accept Crusoe as his sovereign. But the island as a site for the fulfillment of
Crusoe’s yearning for companionship through a master/slave dialectic is not all that
the narrative yields.
In one of the longer dialogues in the narrative, Friday is not only articulated as a
cannibal in need of redemption. While this is what the conversation eventually
proves, it does so via an exchange in which Crusoe is eager to discover  and Friday
is portrayed as concentrated on conveying  a story of “my Nation in the Place
where me was […] in the yonder Place,” but that includes a timeless culture of vari-
ous “Nations” going to “other Place where they think,” and that includes coming
“hither,” to this island. This conversation produces Crusoe’s summary description
of Friday’s more detailed knowledge of distances, “Current and Wind,” and his
admirable navigational skills that locate the island within a region.43 That is, being
indigenous emerges as a regional term that exceeds the shoreline of a hard-to-reach
and hard-to-leave island. This might, of course, reveal Crusoe/Defoe’s racist refusal
to apprehend important distinctions between local people: while not quite Colum-
bus’s “Indians,” Crusoe can only manage to understand from Friday that they are
all “Caribs.”44 On the other hand, this might also be read pre-emptively against
later imperialist strategies to classify and categorize. Tentatively, Friday becomes
aboriginal to the extent that he is not of the island that is the central scene of the
narrative. His aboriginality is told as the story of his relationship to a place offshore
his autochthonous territory. And in this, of course, he is just like Crusoe. For as
Crusoe tells us in the first paragraph of his story, he is born Robinson Kreutznaer
to a Bremen father: and as the story unfolds, he becomes English, not through
dwelling in England, but through his location within a territory far-offshore
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Britain.45 Eventually, of course, this parallel between the (dis)locations of Friday
and Crusoe must be absorbed by the master/slave dialectic that operates so irresist-
ibly within and beyond the novel. But even if Friday is finally a slave and a native
in the sense that he is available for subjection and in need of enlightenment, he is
nonetheless also recognizable as indigenous through Crusoe’s narrative apprecia-
tion of his understanding of spaces and proximities. Friday was not born on the
island and he was not born to anyone of the island: and so he might continue to com-
plicate what is required to be indigenous in certain situations. That problems of
being indigenous  of being of a place, soil, territory, and recognized as such by the
relevant community  is one frontier that delimits and defines the province of exec-
utive power. The very problem of justice posed by executive action (as appropria-
tion, expulsion, the calculability of national security) comes up against the claims to
justice of peoples that are “properly” of a place. It is thus a central technique of
archaic sovereign authority to purport to regulate who is a “proper” native.
How long it takes to become indigenous is a fraught and context-specific ques-
tion. There may be many and diverse reasons for avoiding it, or for broaching it indi-
rectly or partially. This is exemplified in the WikiLeaks case. As well as arguing an
improper motive, the applicants proposed that the Foreign Secretary’s declaration
of BIOT as a “no-take” (the meaning is literal: nothing can be taken from or to such
a zone) MPA was “flawed” because the proposal had failed to disclose that, “in so far
as it prohibited all fishing, [it] would adversely affect the traditional and/or histori-
cal rights of Chagossians to fish in the waters of their homeland, as both Mauritian
citizens and as the native population of the Chagos Islands.”46 The irony of so many
native title claims is played out in the judgment. Richards LJ spends much text con-
sidering the argument based on Mauritian claims, rights and licenses. But he needs
only one swift paragraph to conclude that any possible native title to fishing would
have been extinguished when the islanders were exiled in the 1960s and 1970s.47
Both the slightness of the proposal of a native title, and the swiftness with which it
is put aside is consonant with the earlier line of cases on the Chagossians’ exile
from the archipelago. Within this history, the islanders have fully (dis)appeared as
“subjects” of the British Crown.48 There have been clear and strong strategic rea-
sons for this. But it has led to an oddly shifty submersion of the character of the
islanders as indigenous. Like (but of course not like) the Friday of Crusoe’s narra-
tive, the ancestors of the Chagossians came to live on the islands within the colonial
period: the islands were uninhabited before the French established a plantation
economy and initiated a regional history of forced labor, which was then ceded to
the British at the end of the Napoleonic wars.49 That this history might be too short
and too modern to found an indigenous right seems  albeit inadvertently to
emerge from the legal narrative. And so the staunchness with which Richards and
Laws LJ’s deplore the Chagossians as native in the guise of “Man Fridays” or “Men
Fridays” takes on another aspect. It becomes a distraction: a deflection of the poten-
tial recognition of the Chagossians as native in their own guise. But in thinking
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about the instantiations and ramifications of this, we might find ourselves again
drawn back to Friday in different guise(s).
In her work on the centrality of “collective narrative and standardized history”
in the Chagos Islanders’ self-representation, Laura Jeffery considers the power and
problems of a plural semantics.50 She points out that where the Chagossians’ articu-
lation of a collective memory had moral force in political and media encounters, it
appeared as unreliable and inconsistent in the context of the law’s narrower prefer-
ence for individual eye-witness accounts, and for response over recitation.51
Jeffery’s work points towards more general trouble around forms of representation,
authoritative voices, the mediation of speech, and structures of silence in the line of
judgments relating to the Chagossians’ right not to have been exiled. And we might
begin to bring this trouble into further relief by turning again to the appearance of
Friday/s in the narrative. What is jarring about the FCO memo and the American
Embassy cable is not just the invocation of an archaic and abstract native in the
figure of Friday. It is also the strangeness of the plural: the “Men Fridays” and
“Man Fridays.” This is surely not the form that we expect the reference to take. Fri-
day, while not individuated, is a singular native. But in his singularity, he is
generic. He is “my man Friday” in Crusoe’s own, much repeated phrase: always a
potential plural in being a genre of possession. And he is most fully and famously
possessed, of course, by the form of the work of literature. He is contained within
Crusoe’s journal. Within the strictures of our suspension of disbelief, we do not hear
Friday: rather, we read the transcript of Friday’s speech as recorded by Crusoe.
This is to state the final effect of the narrative: it ensures the silence of Friday. But
it is also to state the beginning of any interpretation of Defoe’s novel, which must
acknowledge his structural demand that we read in-between and past Crusoe’s
silencing lines. Defoe’s novel constructs a sophisticated reader who is arguably
meant to be frustrated by finding themselves marooned in Crusoe’s self-regarding
journal. Understanding this allows us to see something else in the court’s references
to Friday. Most specifically, the complex structuring of Defoe’s book brings into
relief the layering of fiction that characterizes the WikiLeaks judgment, but that
deliberately precludes the sophisticated reader.
In support of their argument that the government intended to institute BIOT as
an MPA in order to prevent their right of return, the Chagossians gathered evi-
dence of executive and administrative actions, meetings, conversations and rhetori-
cal moments that did not rely on the veracity of the cable, but were consolidated by
its potential truth. In dismissing the narrative constructed from these bits and
pieces, Richards LJ sweepingly concludes that it “would provide an unconvincing
plot for a novel.”52 This statement works in forceful combination with the earlier
point in the judgment, in which he allows himself enough (but no more than just
enough) room to clarify that the content of the cable was a fiction, at least to the
extent that it misattributed the reference to “Men Fridays.” Dwelling on their char-
acterization as figures from a novel; and then characterizing them as bad novelists,
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the judgment forecloses the possibility of seeing and hearing the Chagossians. Like
Crusoe’s journal, the judgment is over-determined. Like Friday in Defoe’s novel,
the Chagossians become silent, blurred, within a narrative that deflects the reader
onto the structures of fiction itself. But unlike Defoe’s novel, the judgment is not a
fiction. Its foreclosures cannot be read, like Defoe’s, as a partial, sly or ambivalent
invitation to see and hear a different Friday. Acknowledging how this invitation
has nevertheless been taken up by postcolonial writers, brings into relief a further
and final paradox in the turn to Defoe’s work within the Royal Courts.
Any expectation that re-workings of colonial era stories must strive to retrieve
ghostly figures from between the lines, from the heart of darkness, from the stasis
of Orientalism, and “write back” by lending them more replete life  body, blood,
movement, voice  will be baffled by one of the most eminent and studied literary
reincarnations of Friday. J. M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986) forcefully demonstrates how his
eternal returns mark the impossibility of witnessing and fathoming the figures that
lie behind the cipher that is Friday.
Foe has become canonical  as predicted, with some discomfort, by Derek
Attridge  as a work of measured refusal, or as K. L. Worthington puts it, as a
“masterful portrayal of tactical authorial withdrawal” from the figure of Friday.53
Both wary and admiring of “that style forever on its guard against itself,” Attridge
understands that the power of Coetzee’s novel lies in the (elite) pain of not coming
to terms with the “absolute otherness,” the “absolute absence” in the narrative’s
(non-) representation of Friday.54 Gayatri Spivak teaches the novel as a “halting”
before Friday, who becomes “the wholly other,” not mostly through a dialectic with
Cruso/Crusoe/Defoe/Foe, but through the more intensive and erotically charged
non-dialogue with an incarnation drawn from Defoe’s lesser-known novel Roxana,
who appears as the castaway narrator, Susan Barton.55
Most of Coetzee’s novel is in quotation marks, between which Susan tells of her
shipwreck and years as a castaway on an island  the island  with “Cruso” and
Friday. Structured around her memoir and the letters she writes to “Mr Foe,” the
novel’s quotation marks ask the reader to question the conditions under which sto-
ries are produced. And so the quotation marks also focus the intertextualities of the
novel. Alongside Defoe’s stories, Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Melville mark the
narrative.56 As Attridge recognizes, writing in relation to a canon “governs the act
of writing quite as much as the need for self-expression or the wish to
communicate”: a reading of the novel that highlights the ways intertextuality also
“drives our self-representations and representations,” for “unless we are read, we
are nothing.” We need to be intelligible signs.57
Everyday experiences can be represented in order to construct an identity. But
this is not possible without telling a story. And the possibility of sharing the referen-
ces that occur between narratives is what establishes intelligibility. Coetzee’s novel
works as a refusal to hear, a refusal to listen, because it involves a pre-determined
categorization of who and what one is. As Attridge draws out, there is a fine line
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between deciding the terms and content of a story, what will and will not be told of
one’s self, and the conventions and references that bind and silence another.58 Sus-
an’s story may be read as a repeated refusal to divulge all of her biography, particu-
larly the events that precede her becoming a castaway with Cruso and Friday. She
will not give an account of her daughter’s disappearance:
I choose not to tell it because to no one, not even to you, do I owe
proof that I am a substantial being with a substantial history in the
world. I choose rather to tell of the island, of myself and Cruso and
Friday and what we three did there: for I am a free woman who
asserts her freedom by telling her story according to her own
desire.59
But even as an articulation of her refusal to tell everything, Susan recognizes that
her chosen acts of silence compound other silences: the silence of others. As she
puts it:
Then there is the matter of Friday’s tongue. On the island I accepted
that I should never learn how Friday lost his tongue, as I accepted
that I should never learn how the apes crossed the sea. But what we
can accept in life we cannot accept in history. To tell my story and
be silent on Friday’s tongue is no better that offering a book for sale
with pages in it quietly left empty. Yet the only tongue that can tell
Friday’s secret is the tongue he has lost.60
Even here, we are being told of the possibility of a further misapprehension. Coet-
zee is careful never to confirm or deny that Friday has in fact lost his tongue. It may
be that he cannot speak, and it may be that he chooses not to.61 All we know is that
this is what Cruso tells Susan, and that when Susan looks, she does not see. So
Susan may not be hearing all the tones of Friday’s silence. In this way, Coetzee’s
novel questions the possibility of ever knowing another in their own terms, as “a
substantial body”  even as the novel values, above all else, the attempt to do so.
The slipping and ventriloquizing voices of Susan’s narrative and Coetzee’s novel
find a strange addendum in the author’s 2003 Nobel Prize speech, “He and His
Man.” Here, Crusoe becomes the author and Defoe becomes “my man,” a Friday.
Coetzee himself “halts,” not before a voiceless native, but an idea of a Crusoe/Friday
and a Friday/Defoe passing each other as they labor on ships moving in opposite
directions.62 It can be hard to decipher what such literary multiplications and merg-
ings of Friday, Crusoe and Defoe  and of Susan and her daughter, of Susan and
Friday, and of Friday and Susan’s daughter  are attempting to stall: what senti-
ment or form of thought Coetzee is diverting in his constant refusals of allegory, his
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rejection of an aesthetics of reversal and retrieval, and in the privileging of various
tones of silence over story.
One answer might be found through a reading of the startling appearance of
Crusoe in the 2008 House of Lords opinion on executive action that maintained the
exclusion of the Chagossians from the Archipelago. In this judgment, we find an
even more masterful  but less well measured  withdrawal from the figure of Fri-
day: one that might be read as an awful parody of the ethical abstinences of
Coetzee’s novel. In light of his opinion in favor of the government (part of the major-
ity), Lord Hoffmann considers the earlier Court of Appeal’s judgment that the prac-
ticalities of resettling the Chagossians and the realities of funding are beside the
point. In Sedley LJ’s quoted view, “the point is” that the government’s actions
“negate one of the most fundamental liberties known to human beings, the freedom
to return to one’s own homeland, however poor and barren the conditions of life.”63
Lord Hoffmann disagrees. He writes:
I respectfully think that this misses the point. Funding is the sub-
text of what this case is about. The Chagossians have, not unreason-
ably, shown no inclination to return to live Crusoe-like in poor and
barren conditions of life. The action is, like Bancoult (1), a step in a
campaign to achieve a funded resettlement. […] The Secretary of
State is surely entitled to take into account that once a vanguard of
Chagossians establishes itself on the islands in poor and barren con-
ditions of life, there may be a claim that the United Kingdom is sub-
ject to a sacred trust under article 73 of the United Nations Charter
to “ensure [… the] economic, social and educational advancement”
of the residents and to send reports to the Secretary-General.64
In a persuasive reading of this judgment, T. T. Arvind contends that while Lord
Hoffmann uses a regretful rhetoric of formalism, “the actual legal reasoning is so
without basis as to be unsustainable on any formalist or legalist account.” In
Arvind’s reading, the rhetoric of formalism “cloaks” an exercise in a “particular sort
of judicial pragmatism, of a type to which […] the English legal process is particu-
larly susceptible,” and which is geared around the House of Lord’s disinclination to
set “boundaries on the power of the executive.”65 Lord Hoffmann’s dismissive refer-
ence to the Chagossians themselves as pragmatic rather than principled in their
pursuit of the law becomes ironic, while the reference to Crusoe  that most famous
of practical, outcomes-oriented men  gains weight. It can be read, like the rhetoric
of formalism, as a strategy for deflecting attention from Lord Hoffmann’s own
Crusoe-like pragmatism. (If they are pragmatists, then he  so manifestly not them
 is not.) However, the reference to Crusoe is perhaps even more intriguing as a
form of not invoking Friday, or rather of evoking him under erasure, as a shadow, a
ghost, or an insubstantial body. In describing the Chagossians as potentially
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“Crusoe-like,” Lord Hoffmann is not displacing or reversing the FCO’s infamous
reference to “Man Fridays.” As Coetzee’s novel so powerfully insists, that dialectic
is too tight. The one figure continually  painfully, exuberantly, knowingly, help-
lessly  calls out, calls forth, the other. Can Crusoe “be alone being alone” without
invoking Friday?66 No such solitude is possible. So if the reference to Crusoe is a
calling-up of his shadow, then we might perceive a ghostly Friday stalking Lord
Hoffmann’s judgment, demanding to be recognized as a/as the/as plural “native,”
still requiring justice.
Commenting on the House of Lord’s final refusal to review (to “second guess”)
executive action in the Bancoult case, T. R. S. Allan suggests that “many will won-
der whether such wholesale judicial abstinence is truly defensible.”67 He describes
Lord Hoffmann’s “exaggerated deference” as leading to a “dismal conclusion […],
plainly contrary to the rule of law.”68 What Allan really apprehends is that Lord
Hoffmann’s withdrawal is not abstinence. To abstain is to pursue a refined ethic: to
painfully and carefully not indulge. Lord Hoffmann’s judgment is nothing but an
indulgence: an excessive act, beyond the law. It is a refusal of close ethical measure-
ment. Understanding this, we can return to Coetzee’s novelistic withdrawals and,
seeing them as a truer form of abstinence, read them less disconsolately. However, in
seeking out consonances between Lord Hoffmann’s and other texts of (non-) judgment,
unhappier connections become more evident. His apparent pragmatism is echoed in
another line of cases that excise another Indian Ocean space from judicial review, and
create an offshore through a failure to recognize bodies as signs of themselves.
PART II: DISEMBODYING THE INDIAN OCEAN
Migration and maritime law in Australia has been reconfigured through a decade of
amendments to the Migration Act 1958, and the institution of the Maritime Powers
Act 2013.69 One effect of these changes has been the consolidation of executive
power over offshore territory in the Indian Ocean. The visibility and comprehension
of persons who have presented themselves to the authorities claiming asylum has
been mediated by multiple legislative and executive categorizations. This significa-
tion of bodies is rendered through their positioning and treatment offshore.
Parallels between the UK’s exercise of executive action over BIOT, and Austral-
ia’s treatment of refugees offshore, are awkward to establish and sustain. Such com-
parisons risk schematizing and straining histories, geographies, and cultures.
Nonetheless, there are thought-provoking continuities between the rhetorical strat-
egies of UK and Australian judicial responses to recent deployments of executive
power to exile peoples and persons within the Indian Ocean. Like the Lords in Ban-
coult the High Court of Australia in three recent cases notably insists on a language
of self-limitation that uses the tones of a pained and reasoned abstinence, but
involves a critical withdrawal of sensibility that is in fact neither historically nor
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legislatively beyond the court’s capacity and remit, nor beyond the striving of legal
discourse.
The Australian cases of 2010, 2011 and 2014 concern plaintiffs who arrived on
Christmas Island in Australia by boat. This manner and location of arrival
prompted their categorization as variously/simultaneously “unlawful non-citizens,”
“offshore entry persons” and “unauthorised maritime arrivals” in an “excised off-
shore place.”70 That is, the manner and location of their arrival in Australia reduced
the plaintiffs to a set of extraordinary legislative definitions, bound them to arcane
procedures, and subjected them to a bafflement of their slight hopes, and starker
probabilities of refoulement or forced removal to a third state.
The decisive issue in the 2010 case became the fairness and legality of review
procedures applied by a company contracted by the Department of Immigration
and Citizenship. The decisive issue in the 2011 case (which involved a child) was
the lawfulness of a declaration allowing the forced removal of the plaintiffs to
Malaysia. And the decisive issue in the 2014 case became the granting of a style of
temporary visa that detained the Plaintiff in a circumstance that prevented access
to other forms of processing. The judgments were all for the plaintiffs, but in narrow
terms. What concerns us here is how the High Court of Australia marginally
broached and more fully retracted from considering the possibility of the judicial
review of the granting and exercise of executive power. The rhetorical strategies
and tones of the 2010 judgment are exemplary of the broader movements across the
three judgments.
In the 2010 case, one of the plaintiffs argued that the court had a duty to consider
the in/validity and/or declare the limits of a power granted under s 46A (2), (3) and
(7) of the Migration Act. This section gives the Minister an exclusive and personal
power to allow a declared “unlawful non-citizen” to apply for a visa not otherwise
accessible by this class of person. (The Plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the
Minister had failed in a duty to consider them for such an exercise of power: or, alter-
natively, that the whole s 46 approach to the “unlawful non-citizen” was invalid.) In
other words, the demand was for both a statement of the right to conduct judicial
review, and for such a review. The argument referred to the judgment in Kirk v
Industrial Court (NSW), which states that to deprive a court of its role in declaring
and enforcing the limits on executive power “would be to create islands of power
immune from supervision and restraint.” In a curiously resonant and ironic choice,
French CJ constructs his response to the argument around this very phrase 
“islands of power.”71
In an effort to be succinct, but barely avoiding tautology in his double-negative,
French CJ “does no more than deny that the particular grant of power entails a
duty to consider its exercise.” While acknowledging that an exercise of such power
would entail the possibility of judicial review, he gives himself room summarily and
emphatically to state that “No ”island of power“ is created.”72 The existence of a sov-
ereign power is almost (but not quite) conjured as a material geography. And of
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course this is, precisely, the excised territory of Christmas Island. Just as the unac-
knowledged materiality of Friday haunts Lord Hoffmann’s key reference to Crusoe,
the materiality of this individual geography haunts the abstract rhetoric of island-
ness. Placed together, these ghosts (these haunted matters) allow us to see some-
thing absolute and material about the operation of power across the Indian Ocean.
And even further  as the third part of this paper proposes  we can see the judicial
retreat from executive action exercised by UK and Australian courts as expressive
of the first and final form of sovereignty.
PART III: THE VISIBILITY OF BODIES
In a series of seminars towards the end of his life Jacques Derrida returned to a per-
sistent concern about the distinction between humans and animal  what he
termed the difference between “who” (human or sovereign), and “what” beings (ani-
mals). The fact that in French “sovereign” and “animal” are respectively denoted
through masculine and feminine terms  le soverain and la be^te  also suggested a
further marginalization or difference that required attention.73 In these seminars
the difference between human/animal, masculine/feminine, and sovereign/beast
are explored through Crusoe and Friday, as well as between Louis XIV and an ele-
phant, respectively. The visive power of sovereignty involved in the who/what,
human/animal distinction  the power to see, to name, to gather knowledge, to pos-
sess and comprehend is put into question.74 Knowledge, theory, and ontology are
arranged through these types. Derrida sets out to problematize the separations of
what/who, beast/sovereign, feminine/masculine. The disruption has to begin at the
level of knowledge, of what it means to know, see, cast one’s gaze, have access to an
object known, seen, and graspable: “knowledge is sovereign.”75 One scene of this
deconstructive encounter is Crusoe’s island: or rather, the act of departure from
Crusoe’s island.
In order to think about the “irreducible multiplicity” of those other “living
beings” (the non-human; the beast; the other), Derrida writes that “The limit from
which […] we need to set out looks like the shores, the contour, of an island in which
a Robinsonian man relates to the animal only for himself, with a view to himself,
from his point of view, in his being-for-self.” This departure occurs within a long
meditation on Crusoe on his island as emblematic of the sovereign, and his defini-
tive reduction of this multiplicity.76 This figure allows Derrida to think through the
“autobiography” of the sovereign as variously bored, distanced, melancholy, long-
ing, and obsessively terrified of certain kinds of death.77 All these characteristics
are approached and re-approached as aspects of the sovereign as definitively alone.
Derrida asks us to consider the difference between the statements “I am alone”
and “I am alone with you,” and to feel the greater “abyss”  the greater sense of soli-
tude  that inheres in the second statement.78 This idea recurs and inhabits the
sovereign as an “I” who “organizes the economy of his solitude in the company of
LAW & LITERATURE  VOLUME 27  NUMBER 2
268
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 So
uth
am
pto
n H
igh
fie
ld]
 at
 03
:29
 15
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
those, the others, who, as close as can be to him, with him, or even in him […] do not
accompany him.”79 In broaching the sovereign’s relationship to “the other,” Derrida
turns to two types of scene/figure in Defoe’s narrative: haunting/specters (particu-
larly in the opening of The Farther Adventures) and cannibals/cannibalism (“more
other” than the beast).80 This allows him to understand the shape of the sovereign
as a body; and sovereignty as a fearful, and thus lonely, concentration on the owned
body in both its materiality, and its potential ghostliness. The beast, says Derrida,
is likewise “Robinsonian” in its aloneness. It also is deprived of the company of “the
other, of that alterity in general.”81 So what we get from Derrida’s engagement with
Crusoe on his island is an idea of the sovereign as, like the beast, “poor in world”
(that is the island as emblematic of sovereignty), and unaccompanied by the others
that accompany and define his sovereignty.
Another scene for the deconstructive encounter with the sovereign, for Derrida, is
that of the autopsy or anatomical dissection of an elephant conducted in front of
Louis XIV in 1681.82 The dismemberment of the elephant in front of Louis XIV, and
the “precision with which its parts were examined,” manifests the macabre conceit of
absolute knowledge. It is an event that follows a combat  what Derrida calls an
unconsciously amorous and narcissistic seduction, hunt, and capture.83 It is a phe-
nomenological event in that the elephant appears as an object under the “Sun King’s”
gaze.84 The king owns and knows, possesses and has knowledge of the beast for plea-
sure. This knowledge is mediated by institutions  the anatomy lesson unfolds under
the authority of the French Academy of Sciences created by the monarch. This
“knowing-power, power-to-know, knowing-how-to-see, and sovereign being-able-to-
see is not, fundamentally, revolutionized by the French Revolution.”85 The sover-
eignty of nation or people in the modern international system is a new form of the
same structure. At the heart of the matter is its sovereign mastery over the beast.
The absolute knowledge of the sovereign also extends to history  the sense that
everything is known in advance.86 Derrida draws on Louis Marin’s book The Por-
trait of the King to express the as if, the simulacrum effect or fiction of the sovereign
spectacle. “Absolute knowledge” means that everything happens “as though it were
known in advance,” and thus like a “marionette,” programmed and “providentially
prescribed.”87 This historiography of the sovereign creates in the readerspectator
“the simulacrum, the illusion, that he is the one who is pulling the strings of the
marionette of history.”88 This is the “as if” central to sovereignty:
Sovereignty is this narrative fiction or this effect of representation.
Sovereignty draws all its power, all its potency, i.e. its all powerful
nature, from this simulacrum effect, this fiction or representation
effect that is inherent and congenital to it, as it were co-originary.89
The archaic sovereign ambition, in relation to the issues discussed in this paper, is
to treat space and subjects such as Chagossians and boat migrants as marionettes.
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In the increase of executive authority, and the looming attempts to destroy the rem-
nants of judicial oversight, it is the absolutist power of the puppeteer that is anx-
iously asserted. Sovereignty as the “pulling of strings” is a distribution of simulacra
effects. Notions such as “transfer, translation, transition, tradition, inheritance,
economic distribution etc.” are the site of the division, transaction, and negotiation
of sovereignty.90 These are the productive sites for dividing the archaic absolute
sovereignty we encounter in the case of the Chagossians and the boat migrants.
CONCLUSIONS
Sovereignty does not exist as such. The fictions of the Chagossians as undecidably
Crusoe/Friday, and the excising of Christmas Island from Australian jurisdiction,
are exemplars of the simulacrum effect on which the sovereign conceit is founded
and exercised. Space and beings become the effects of fictional representation. In
the name of an anxious sovereignty (marked as global security or border protection),
an absolute all-seeing, all-knowing sovereign knowledge is claimed. People arriving
in boats are already deemed “economic migrants” rather than people fleeing perse-
cution. They are subject to a logic of “fairness” that casts them as gaining an
“advantage” they do not deserve. (The Australian government’s policy is driven by
the notion of “no advantage” to those who arrive by boats as distinct from those
“processed” in UNHCR camps outside Australia.) But what would it mean for bodies
in and from these excised zones (Christmas Island) or emptied spaces (Chagos
archipelago) offshore to be differently discernible? What signs and markers of
intelligibility might structure the difference between boat migrants and Chagos-
sians as “who” or “what” beings?
There has been a recent turn inward by scholars of empire and across postcolo-
nial studies. This entails a move away from the intimate as an analogue of larger
structures of empire, and a turn to understanding intimacy as the structure of
imperialism. One resource for understanding empire as a “domain of the intimate”
is the legal archive.91 Trial records and judgments, family court and constitutional
rulings, boxes of evidence and collations of reportage: all these archives allow a re-
imagining of intimate spaces and relations that might otherwise be untraceable.
The legal archive is the site in which traces of “intimate realms” can be expected
and found.92 The appearance of Friday and Crusoe in a court today is troubling pre-
cisely because it calls up this arcane formulation of intimacy. Crusoe and Friday
are not just or even an analogue of imperialism’s public ambition. Robinson Crusoe
is rather a story of the intimacies forged and refused under colonialism. The island
does not  as it has been so often and over-determinedly read  primarily prefigure
the vast empire to come. It is more fully told as a site divided into and by the
settler’s private spaces, and it more completely expresses and dwells upon Crusoe’s
imagined desire to articulate both the particular and the generic nature of his rela-
tions with Friday. Thought about this way, it is possible to re-read the references to
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Friday and Crusoe in the Bancoult cases. They appear less as a rhetorical means by
which an ethical resolution is expressed, and more as an inadvertent but powerful
summoning of an archaic formulation of intimacy. What haunts the judgments is
not so much an old and intimately familiar demand for justice. What haunts the
judgment is that it is an old and familiar demand for justice: one that should long
ago have been satisfied, or should at least have shifted terms.93 And so the figura-
tion of Friday and Crusoe in the judgments becomes uncanny. All too familiar, they
appear out of place: they disrupt, and come to signify anxiety more than certainty.
Apparently part of a discourse of ethical assurance, the references to Friday and
Crusoe discomfort more than they console. And in this they are consonant with
Defoe’s writing, in which the ghost is both a disturbance and a consolation.
Gathering evidence from his various writings, Homer O. Brown demonstrates
Defoe’s fascination with ghosts. Concentrating particularly on the places in which
the ghostly other appears, or the other appears as ghostly, he concludes that Defoe
was “always suspicious of the unified and identifiable subject.”94 But if we turn to
the second of Defoe’s novels about Crusoe, The Farther Adventures of Robinson Cru-
soe (1719), then we might argue that he is less interested in ghostliness as a form of
disintegrating subjectivity, and more interested in the ghost as a form of longing.
The Farther Adventures tells the story of Crusoe after he returns to England. He
marries, has children, becomes wealthy through investment, and becomes morally
discomforted by his ease. He moves out of London, buys a farm in Bedfordshire, and
tries to recreate the life of satisfying labor he left behind in the Caribbean. But this
life is only ever a faint version of his past life on his island. (His life in Bedfordshire
is a ghostly other of the more vivid memory of his Caribbean island.) So when his
wife dies, he determines to return in order to check on his “colony,” his “kingdom”
(as in the first volume, the descriptions of his sovereign holding are constant and
various).95 His decades of life up to this re-departure are summarily told in about
ten pages. Nonetheless, this part of the narrative is full of enough detail that we are
startled by the sudden re-appearance of Friday: or rather, the realization that Fri-
day never actually disappeared. For it is only when Crusoe is about to step onto a
ship to return to sea that he bothers to mention he is accompanied by “my Man
Friday.”96 We can only presume that Friday has been present during the decades of
marriage and children, investment and farming. If he was rendered ghostly by the
mediation of Crusoe’s journal in the first volume, he is an even more spectral pres-
ence in the opening passages of The Farther Adventures. Although early in the nar-
rative, the reader is explicitly directed to be alert to this very “matter” of ghostly
presences, as Crusoe meditates:
I have often heard Persons of good Judgment say, That all the Stir
People make in the World about Ghosts and Apparitions, is owing to
the strength of Imagination, and the powerful Operation of Fancy
in their Minds; that there is no such Thing as a Spirit appearing, or
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a Ghost walking, and the like: That Peoples poring affectionately
upon the past Conversation of their deceas’d Friends, so realizes it
to them, that they are capable of fancying upon some extraordinary
Circumstances, that they see them; talk to them, and are answered
by them, when in Truth, there is nothing but Shadow and Vapour
in the Thing; and they really know nothing of the Matter.97
This extraordinary passage is never, of course, realized as Crusoe’s longing for his
dead “good wife”: as Crusoe sanguinely states, “It is not my business here to write an
Elegy upon my Wife.”98 Far more sustained is his longing for a lost conversation
with his island, which is so intense and irrefutable that it haunts his dreams, waking
and sleeping.99 But as the narrative progresses, we must understand this passage as
ultimately directing us to Crusoe’s relationship to the most substantial ghost in his
world. And indeed, one way of recognizing Coetzee’s rewriting of Defoe is as an even
farther and more emphatic embodying of Friday as  or rather, beyond  Crusoe’s
ghostly longing within The Farther Adventures.
Coetzee’s deployment of gothic conventions, tropes and spaces in Foe invites us
to read the novel as a ghost story. And placing an out-and-out ghost story by Defoe
at the centre makes this invitation difficult to refuse. (Arguably “A True Relation of
the Apparition by One Mrs Veal” displaces Crusoe and Roxana, as well as works by
Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Melville, as the most important intertextual reference.)
But interest in Coetzee’s version of Defoe’s ghosts has not fully captured the rela-
tionship of his specters to The Farther Adventures. While we can see this later nar-
rative traversing Coetzee’s novel from the beginning, it is in the short final chapter
that it arguably becomes the crucial intertextual sign. This is because it is this
chapter that witnesses Friday in death. And it is in The Farther Adventures that we
are told of Friday’s death.
The final part of Coetzee’s novel is without quotation marks. This invites us into
a more intimate relationship with the narrative. We enter a house (the house is
gothic, we are like a ghost) that has a plaque bolted to the wall stating it was the
home of “Daniel Defoe, Author”  which tells us that this is now, the time of the
reader. Here we encounter bodies: perhaps Susan or her daughter, perhaps Cruso/
Crusoe or Defoe. This is not certain. The only certainty is the body of Friday. But as
the “I” of the narrative has somehow become the reader, the house has somehow
become a shoreline; then a boat, the surface of an ocean; and finally a descent into a
shipwreck. Friday’s body only becomes its “own sign” when the reader dives to find
him, slowly turning, at the bottom of the ocean: “But this is not a place of words.
Each syllable, as it comes out, is caught and filled with water and diffused. This is a
place where bodies are their own signs. It is the home of Friday.”100
Rich and provocative as it is, Spivak’s much-quoted valuing of Coetzee’s render-
ing of the “body as its own sign” is oddly disembodied from the precise physicalities
and geographies of this final scene. In Coetzee’s novel, it is crucially only in the
LAW & LITERATURE  VOLUME 27  NUMBER 2
272
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 So
uth
am
pto
n H
igh
fie
ld]
 at
 03
:29
 15
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
place of the most absolute silence  beyond the crowding of voice, story, intertextual
reference, historiography, textuality, signs  that the body ensigns itself. It is only
at the bottom of the ocean: and the silence here is not the same as the silencing and
misapprehensions of Friday that occur within Crusoe’s journal, Susan’s memoirs,
or the judgments of the UK courts. This is a silence that precisely allows us to
attend to  to feel against our “eyelids,” “the skin of our face,” as the narrative’s
final lines insists  Friday as himself. And in insisting on this body as only itself, in
the ocean’s deepest silence, the final chapter of Foe reads a direct and vigilant cor-
rective to Defoe’s own rendering of Friday’s final scene.
Drawing her reading of Foe back to Defoe’s original, Spivak remind us “of the
last scene involving Friday in Robinson Crusoe.” In her reading, this is the episode
in which Friday talks to, dances with, and kills a bear. Speaking in English and
using a gun instead of an arrow, Spivak suggests that Friday is “on his way out of
the margin” (to England).101 But this is not the last scene involving Friday written
by Defoe. That occurs just over half way through The Farther Adventures. Crusoe
and Friday have returned to the island: Friday has danced for and with his father,
and he has fought with and killed various natives who have threatened Crusoe’s
“colony.” But as they are leaving the island to continue on their yet farther adven-
tures, Friday is killed by yet another group of vaguely characterized cannibals.
Lamenting the loss of “my poor Friday, whom I so entirely loved and valued, and
who, indeed, so well deserved it”: narrating himself as “the most disconsolate crea-
ture alive for want of my Man Friday,” Crusoe “buried him with all the decency and
solemnity possible, by putting him into a coffin and throwing him into the sea.”102
But arguably even this is not the last scene involving Friday. As his body lies at the
bottom of the Atlantic, and Crusoe proceeds to his farther adventures, he is surely
haunted by his “deceas’d Friend.” Not alone (he is on a ship full of men), but most
fully alone without “my Man Friday,” Crusoe sails around the cape, into the Indian
Ocean, and up the East Coast of Africa. As he heads in the direction of the Chagos
Archipelago, surely the silent specter of Friday accompanies him. In Defoe’s narra-
tive, this is the silent ghost of Crusoe’s chattering, imperial longing. But in
Coetzee’s rendering, this is the substantial body as, in its deep and oceanic silence,
the sign of itself.
Examining the juridicalized body as literary character, this paper began with a
troubled apprehension of the disenfranchizing and disembodying capacities of UK
law. But as our introduction intimates, such forms of offshoring have excessive
meaning. Comparison with Australian forms of legal excision and retreat help to
bring these vaster lineaments into relief: the oceanic outline that emerges is of an
anxious sovereign, re-orienting a radical title, crossing the Indian Ocean. This re-
spatialization points to a new nomos that is not fully apprehensible through the
paradigms and oppositions currently been driven by work on Schmitt. As our con-
clusive return to the different anxieties of Coetzee’s novel suggests, we should be
continuously troubled by any direction away from the body as a “sign of itself.”
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